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The Introduction shows that privacy can be conceptualised in terms of seclusion and solitude, 
anonymity and confidentiality, intimacy and domesticity, so that it is unnecessary to agree on a 
definition of privacy in order to analyse it philosophically.  It shows that democratic theory and 
practice provide a set of working assumptions about what is valuable and right, equal and unequal, 
free and unfree which enable us to distinguish privacy from other values, and to resolve those 
disagreements about its nature and value which are, in fact, resolvable by some combination of 
theory and practice.  
Ch.1 examines the reasons why thoughtful and well-meaning people disagree about the nature and 
value of privacy. It shows that both instrumental and non-instrumental claims about the value of 
privacy face familiar difficulties, which often have less to do with privacy itself, than with the 
difficulty of substantiating causal claims, on the one hand, and beliefs about value on the other.  
However, a look at the importance of the secret ballot shows that privacy can be valuable, because 
critical to people’s freedom and equality, although it prevents us from punishing all selfish, 
thoughtless and coercive behaviour.   
 
Ch. 2 looks at the ethics of ‘outing’ – or the publication without consent of true personal 
information.  It shows that privacy protections for confidentiality, anonymity and seclusion can 
enhance, rather than undermine, freedom of expression.  It distinguishes democratic from 
consequentialist and Kantian objections to outing and uses the experience of Oliver Sipple to 
illustrate these differences.  Finally, it distinguishes freedom of expression and freedom of the press, 
and uses the controversy over the publication of ‘kiss and tell’ stories to illuminate the importance 
of privacy both to individual freedom and to democratic government.   
 
Ch. 3 looks at the implications of privacy for sex, reproduction and the family.  It shows that our 
claims to privacy do not stop at the door of our house, but shape our rights as employers and 
employees, soldiers and civilians, parents and children.  It explains why the right to live with, and to 
look after, those we love is central to democratic politics. Hence special tests of wisdom, virtue, 
wealth or connections are as inimical to a democratic conception of privacy as they are to a 




Ch. 4 looks at Judith Thomson’s claim that privacy rights are just property rights in disguise.  It shows 
that claims to privacy cannot always be reduced to claims over property, illustrating the argument 
with the contrasting claims to privacy and property of Joyce Maynard and John Salinger, once their 
relationship had ended.  It shows that collective forms of property can be necessary to privacy, and 
uses recent work on poverty and homelessness to illustrate its claims.  Finally, it explains why 
people’s claims to privacy can justify forms of private ownership without threatening socio-
economic equality and democratic government.  
 
The Conclusion explains that privacy is valuable, if we care about democracy, because it helps to 
protect people from unjustified scorn, humiliation and recrimination. However, there is nothing 
intrinsic to privacy which means that it must support, rather than undermine, people’s freedom, 
equality and happiness. Rather, the value of privacy depends, in part, on what we believe and do.  If 
privacy is to be a democratic value, then, we must describe it in ways that reflect people’s claims to 
equality and self-government, and must act so that privacy is valuable for everyone, and not just for 
a favoured or fortunate few.   
 
